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When the objective is to construct a society that embraces peace, the concept of resilience refers to the capacity that a society has to endure, overcome, and emerge even stronger from situations of violent conflict. In order for this to occur, it is important to identify the capacities that a community has to confront the challenges that violent conflict can pose. In many cases, resilience is a concept that has been generalized and carelessly used to describe specific characteristics and concrete relationships of a reaction, a causality, or a state of being.
The theoretic debate and the evolution of the concept itself results in the understanding of resilience as the ability of an object to absorb the impact or the tension and return to its original condition. That is, resilience is often discussed in terms of a process of absorption. For example, a person can withstand great emotional strain and simply absorb it and store it within his or her own emotional capacity without doing much about it. However, it is a human trait to seek a way to reduce or deal with this emotional strain. This then leads to the second component of resilience in the theoretical debate: adaptation. Adaptation refers to the ability of an object to absorb the tension, strain, or pain caused by an external event and its capacity to adapt to the effects of the external variable. It is important to note that there cannot be resilience if the element of an external event is not present. The external event provides the tension or the shock that activates the abilities previously mentioned. In the socio-environmental context, resilience is understood as the capacity that an ecosystem has of receiving an impact while conserving the same function, structure, and identity. Resilience in this context manifests itself with reference to the magnitude of the perturbations that can be assimilated before the changes its structure and its functions. This is what then leads to the restoration of the system for its own preservation and its ability to survive and evolve in a sustainable manner. In this sense, environments and natural habitats can be said to be resilient. Since there must be an element of an external shock, resilience is thus understood as resilience towards something or in relationship an external factor. Therefore, it is incorrect to assume an object as naturally resilient. Resilience is generated, developed, and matured at the moment in which it is exposed to the external element. This then results in a process of resilience towards something. Under western perception, resilience is often seen as an individual rather than a collective trait. Here is where the concept encounters a conceptual gap in its implementation in peacebuilding processes. There is growing interest on the specific sources of fragility and resilience in the context of fragile states and those affected by conflict. The main objective here is to identify the capacities of communities to confront conflict, anticipate risks, resolve problems in a collaborative and non-violent form, respond creatively to conflict and crisis, and impulse a social change that transforms the structural foundations of the conflict in order to foster peace and its development. Peace, in addition to being an objective automatically defined by the end of an armed conflict, is a long-term process that is geared towards the constant strengthening of the social capacities to transform conflict through non-violent methods. In this sense, conflict transformation or peacebuilding is understood as a process of transformation rather than absorption or adaptation. Therefore, conflict is inherent in any social and political system. This is true due to the diversity in human ideas, interests, and agendas. In that sense, conflict can be a positive trait for social change as long as conveys itself in non-violent forms. The way in which conflict is understood is essential in order to define the type of action needed for social change. In other words, there will always be tensions or "conflictability" within a community. This differs with conflict in the sense that the latter produces polarization due to the lack of trust, lack of legitimacy towards state institutions, and the presence of violence. Peace, understood as the situation that arises once and armed confrontation has ended, is an aspiration that is overcome due to the persistence of the "conflictability" and the various incomplete and limited reforms that are left from the period post-conflict. These are usually materialized through poverty, inequality, corruption, and violence. Hence, peacebuilding, as a framework that is used as a reference for social change, mainly consists of a series of actions that are fundamental for the transformation of conflicts and that help guide social forces towards common objectives centred around overcoming communal obstacles so that, in this way, a peaceful coexistence can be achieved. This is what the concept of resilience in the context of conflict essentially means. In conclusion, the concept of resilience within peacebuilding refers to the collective capacities of a society to transform conflict into a series of actions that enable peaceful coexistence albeit ongoing disagreement in ideas, interests, and agendas. The analytical strategy can be summarized into three main components. The first refers to the actions as a response of the social groups towards armed conflict. The second, the substance of the strategy, is the articulation of the actions in the function of their contribution to the generation of peace and social capital within the social cohesion of a community. Finally, the identification of the capacities that allow this to take place is at the forefront of resilience. This final component is what allows the strategy to be replicated in other scenarios. Of course, local context must always be taken into account in the construction of a peacebuilding strategy. There have been significant challenges within academia in the understanding of the concept of resilience as a consequence of armed conflict and its potential in becoming the center-piece for a peacebuilding project. This reflection sought to bring a wider understanding of the concept under examination. The study of democracy in Latin America has been extensive since much of the region transitioned from authoritarian regimes to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. Much of the debate focused on giving a definition to the form of democracy that was being implemented by governments across Latin American countries. The purpose of this paper is to extend the research of democracy in Latin America in its attempt of determining the challenges to democracy in the region. This article uses Colombia as a case study to identify the three most significant challenges to democracy in this specific country. The paper argues that political exclusion, political violence, and socioeconomic inequality are the three most significant challenges to Colombian democracy. Introduction To properly approach the concept of democracy in Latin America, the term must first be defined. Schmitter and Karl (1991:76) define democracy as: “a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.”[1]In addition, Robert Dahl (1982:11) identifies a series of political institutions that are needed in a democracy: elected officials, free, fair, and frequent elections, extended suffrage to practically all adults, almost all adults have the right to run for office, freedom of expression without the fear of being punished, freedom of access of alternative sources of information, and freedom of association.[2] As Gerardo Munk (2015:371) notes, the Latin American political context of democracy has generally relied on the minimalist concept of electoral democracy in which elections are the only means of access to government offices, elections are based on the universal right to vote and the right to run for office without proscriptions, and elections are devoid of violence or fraud. Moreover, Guillermo O’Donnel (1994:55-56) argues that historical factors, along with the sever socioeconomic problems of Latin American countries, has resulted in democratic regimes that are not institutionally consolidated and that are characterized by practices and conceptions about the practice of political authority that lead to “delegative” democracies.[3] The first section of this case study examines how political exclusion has led to a regime predominated by the traditional elite and the persecution or extermination of alternative political actors legitimized by the use of the “state of exception”. The second section argues that continued political exclusion has generated political violence and resulted in a state of “violent pluralism” in which human, civil, and political rights have been repeatedly violated. The third section looks at how Colombia’s socioeconomic inequality, fuelled by the global integration of the Colombian economy, has led to the reduction of political representation and the rise of a transnational state that weakens the legitimacy of the democratic system. Political Exclusion in Colombia Political exclusion has been a prevalent characteristic of the Colombian regime.[4]The traditional governing elite has repeatedly excluded opposing political actors by establishing political pacts between the two traditional political parties. In instances when a political pact has proven insufficient to silence and exclude opposition, the government has resolved to exterminate the opposition. This has been done through the use of the “state of exception”. Political exclusion in Colombia is best exemplified through two historical events: the “Frente Nacional” and the extermination of the “Union Patriotica” (UP). Since the consolidation of the Colombian Conservative and Liberal parties in the mid-19thcentury, Colombian democracy has been limited to a duopoly of the monopoly of power (Ramirez 2010:85). The best representation of the exclusive two-party regime in Colombia is the 16-year political pact that lasted from 1958-74, better known as the “Frente Nacional”. During this period, the Conservative and Liberal parties agreed on a power sharing governing pact in which power would alternate every four years between the two parties through elections. During the “Frente Nacional” all governing positions were equally divided amongst the two parties while no other political actors were allowed to contest the power structure. The “Frente Nacional” also served as a strategy to repress, silence, and alienate all radical liberal “gaitanistas” and self-defence left-winged groups. These groups had mobilized against the Conservative and Liberal oligarchy after the assassination of populist Liberal Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in 1948 (Guzman Campos: 1962). It was this era of high political exclusion that resulted in the birth of left-winged guerrillas such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Although the “Frente Nacional” opened up a democratic space for the participation of the two traditional parties, this political pact excluded alternative actors and relied on the use of “state of exception” to maintain political order (Pizarro Leongómez, 1991:159).[5]Between 1949 and 1991, when the current constitution was enacted, Colombia was under a state of siege for a cumulative total of thirty years. It was during this period that the government developed sophisticated mechanisms of repression and terror to defeat all of those individuals or groups considered as adversaries. One of the state’s mechanisms to repress and silence adversaries was the use of political assassins by both Liberal and Conservatives in their efforts of ensuring electoral victory as well as protecting their economic interests (Palacios 2006:164). In 1968, it became legal to create civil defense groups to privately confront guerillas and to support the army’s counterinsurgency efforts. Many right-wing landowners and drug traffickers formed such groups “in order to protect themselves and help the government retake and secure rural land being surrendered to the guerilla groups” (Holmes et al 2006:168). In 1984, after escalating violence and deteriorating civil-military relations, president Belisario Betancourt Cuartas decided to sign an amnesty agreement with a big block of the FARC, M-19, and EPL guerrilla forces in efforts to broaden political participation and avert greater armed conflict (Watson 2000: 533). [6]As Watson notes, the disarmed groups often decided to participate in the electoral system and the FARC remnants formed the UP, while the M-19formed the Accion Democratica-Movimiento 19 (ADM-19). However, Colombian military and paramilitary forces continued to view these groups as subversive and a threat to the state. The UP had been formed from amnestied elements of the FARC and had been particularly successful in North-western Colombia at the local electoral level. UP supporters and alleged supporters increasingly became targets of massacres, with violence ascribed to the paramilitaries, whose rhetoric increasingly focused on the need to cleanse society of anti-Colombian elements. Between 1984 and 1990, more than 1000 members of the UP were assassinated. Political exclusion has been an enduring characteristic of Colombian politics; one that has limited the participation of alternative political actors and given birth to various armed guerilla movements. The government has devised mechanisms that allow for the use of repression and violence to eliminate all opposition that pose a threat the traditional structure of power. Through the use of the “state of exception”, military actions against civilians have been legitimized in the government’s efforts to achieve long-term institutional stability. Political Violence The state’s use of military forces and counter-insurgent paramilitary groups has led to high levels of political violence and a state of “violent pluralism” in which human, civil, and political rights have been repeatedly violated. As aptly pointed out by Brubaker and Laitin (1998), one should not conceive of political violence as a higher degree of conflict, but as a process following its own logic, whose episodes follow a volatile trajectory, largely endogenous and highly contingent. Political violence and illegality in the periphery is intrinsic to the maintenance of Colombia’s model of democracy, where a counterinsurgency metanarrative legitimizes the dirty war carried out by the armed forces against political alternatives portrayed as leftists, at times with paramilitary proxies or in alliance with paramilitaries (Ramirez 2010:85-86). This type of political violence has resulted in a state of “violent pluralism”.[7]This behaviour has led to numerous human rights violations, and has directly limited civil and political rights.[8] In response to trade union violence, political protest, and other forms of political and social resistance, military forces throughout the 1980s were responsible for the detention of over 8,000 individuals, numerous forced disappearances, and allegations of torture (Aviles 2006:386). Throughout the 1980-90s, paramilitaries expanded their participation to the rural regions of the country. Since much of the rural territory was ignored by the state, these self-defence groups served as the protection forces for the rural elite against any threats from left-winged guerrillas. As Aviles (2006:384-385) notes, paramilitary groups became even more crucial to military forces and the state as increased international pressure, especially from the US, called upon the Colombian government to consolidate a less violent and more democratic regime in the transition to a neoliberal globalized capitalist state. The overt use of repression and violence was thus transferred over to paramilitary forces. By the 1990s, the paramilitary groups had replaced the armed forces as the leading perpetrators of human right violations, accounting for about 70 per cent of political assassinations (Aviles 2006: 384). In 1989, paramilitary groups were banned and a series of anti-paramilitary policies where established after it was proven that paramilitaries were responsible for more civilian deaths than guerrillas (Kline 1999: 75-76). However, this was not the end of the participation of paramilitaries in Colombian politics. Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, various presidents, including Ernesto Samper (1994-98) and Alvaro Uribe Velez (2002-2010), have supported the creation of new civilian militias in counter insurgency strategies, most famously known as CONVIVIR (Aviles 2006: 397).[9]Only after two years of their existence, these new private self-defence groups displaced over 200,000 peasants (Hylton 2003: 88). Most recently, ex-president Alvaro Uribe Velez and many of the members of his government are being investigated for what has come to be known as “para-politics”. As Vanden & Prevost (2017:452) note, in 2006 sixty-eight members of Congress were being investigated on allegations that they connections with paramilitaries. The long history of tension, confrontation, and violence has led to the construction of a culture of violence in Colombia. As Pécaut (2001:91) argues, coercion and violence are now fixed components of the social and political machinery of Colombia and any attempt to change this must include sincere and arduous efforts. Social Inequality The underlying causes of Colombia’s political violence revolve around broad factors such as unequal access to economic power, especially land and resources, and unequal access to political power, which ultimately, are institutional factors related to the creation of guerrilla and paramilitary violence (World Bank 2000:6). Colombia’s socioeconomic inequality, fuelled by the global integration of the Colombian economy, has led to the reduction of political representation and the rise of a transnational state that weakens the legitimacy of the democratic system. The conflict in Colombia has mainly been a rural phenomenon where the vast majority of victims have been the rural poor (Rojas & Tubb 2013:132).In the early stages of the conflict in Colombia, intense violence resulted in a high number of forcefully displaced individuals, landless peasants, and increased levels of poverty in the rural areas. It was in these regions that guerilla forces recruited the majority of their combatants (Palacios 1995:167). The isolation of these communities has led to an increased influence of insurgent groups. Moreover, the 1980s and early 1990s saw the introduction of a series of political and economic reforms that sought to further democratize the country and integrate the Colombian economy to the global system. As Bejarano & Pizarro (2005:14) argue, these reforms contributed to the “extreme atomization of political representation” and weakened the legitimacy of the democratic system. These reforms consists not only of the decentralization of capitalist production and introduction of neoliberal economic policies, they also result in the transformation of the state into a “transnational state” (Robinson 2001: 18).[10]Robinson also argues that this transformation is linked with a process of democratization that is limited by capitalist globalization and the interest of transnational corporations and the emergence of the transnational elite (Robinson 2000: 90). Aviles (2006: 384) argues that this process of transformation in Colombia has promoted a regime that has co-opted and repressed opposition while globally integrating the economy. External pressures to create a welcoming environment for international business and transnational corporations accompany this process, resulting in an increased paramilitary repression against guerrilla insurgency in the efforts to further exclude them from the political process. Aviles argues that this process results in a “Low-Intensity Democracy”.[11] In order to foster neoliberalism and transnational corporations, the Colombian government and the state’s armed forces tolerated and promoted paramilitary repression of political and social opposition to the globalization of the economy. Individuals who opposed this transition into neoliberalism righteously did so as the burden of neoliberalism fell on the rural and urban poor. The opening of the economy led to an unemployment rate of 20 percent by 1999, the elimination of jobs in the agrarian sector, and the weakening role of the state. This worsened the state of violence by forcing agrarian workers to substitute their traditional crops for drug production or to join either the guerilla or paramilitary forces (Ahumada & Andrews 1998: 462). The economic transformation has also resulted in the exacerbation of rural poverty in particular, the extreme levels of land ownership, and increased levels of income inequality.[12]. Conclusion Political exclusion, political violence, and social inequality are factors deeply rooted in Colombia’s long history of conflict and confrontation. It has been through the use of coercion, repression, and exclusion that the traditional elite has monopolized political and economic power. Political exclusion and political violence have thus become practices engrained in the political behavior of the regime and has shaped the interaction between the state and civilians. Social inequality has led to the decrease of political representation and the increased tensions. These are all challenges that jeopardize the future of Colombian democracy. There has been a spark of hope with the recent signing of the peace agreement in 2016 between the government and the FARC guerilla forces. However, the 2018 congressional and presidential elections have demonstrated that tensions remain high and that polarization has once again put Colombians at odd. If Colombia is to become an inclusive and prosperous democracy, all Colombians must be made part of the decision-making process and the government must demonstrate a sincere effort towards harmonizing the interest of all Colombians. Further research on the topic should focus on examining the ways in which a state facing similar challenges can consolidate a strong and stable democracy. NOTES [1]Schmitter & Karl’s definition builds onJoseph Schumpeter’s (1943:269) minimalist definition of democracy: “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisionswhich realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will. [2]Schmitter & Karl (1991:81) complement Dahl’s initial work by stating that in a democracy “elected officials must be able to exercise their constitutional powers without being subjected to overriding opposition from unelected officials” and that “the polity must be self-governing; it must be able to act independently of constraints imposed by some other overarching political system.” [3]“Delegative democracies rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office” (O’Donnel 1994:59). [4]Hedstrom & Smith (2013:11) refer to political exclusion as the process in which an individual or group is excluded from participation in political processes. This exclusion may stem from law, custom, intimidation or discrimination. [5]Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara (1998) has called attention to the use of the ‘‘state of exception’’ as a government mechanism to legitimize military actions against civilians and thereby achieve long-term institutional stability. In Colombia, the “state of exception” meant that civil rights were restricted and the powers of the armed forces to arrest, interrogate, and try civilians for crimes of subversion, and to govern large regions of the country were expanded (NCOS 1995: 53). [6]The M-19th (Movimiento 19 de abril) center-left insurgent group was established by university students after the fraudulent elections of 1970. The EPL (Ejercito Popular de Liberacon) is a Marxist-Leninist armed guerrilla group that was established in 1967. Finally, the Marxist-Leninist FARC guerilla forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) were established in 1964. [7]Arias & Goldstein (2010:5) define this term “as a way to think about violence in Latin American society as not merely concentrated in the state or in ‘‘deviant’’ groups and individuals who contravene otherwise accepted norms of comportment in a consensual democratic society.” [8]In the Colombian context, violent pluralism can be understood as “the situation that ensues when demands for democratic, nonviolent alternatives to conflict resolution that can bring into dialogue multiple, divergent voices are met with resistance by the state, while the civilians who embrace a nonviolent approach are treated as potential enemies threatening the integrity of Colombian democracy” (Roldan 2010:64). [9]Asociasiones Comunitarias de Vigilencia Rural (CONVIVIR) were authorized by the Samper administration in 1994 to provide special vigilant services and private security and were limited to a defense function, supporting the armed forces with intelligence about local communities. [10]A transnational state is a set of institutions that operates in order to advance the interests of transnational corporations, with national states becoming components of a larger economic and political project (Aviles 2006: 383). [11] Giles et al (1993) define Low-Intensity Democracy as a largely procedural democracy that allows political opposition, greater individual freedoms, and a more permeable environment for the investments of transnational capital. Giles and Rocamora (1992: 505) also argue that the paradox of low intensity democracy is that a civilianized conservative regime can pursue painful and even repressive social and economic policies with more impunity and with less popular resistance than can an openly authoritarian regime. [12]Between 1997 and 2000 the Gini Coefficient for income distribution increased from 0.54 to 0.59: the income of the richest 10 percent of the population increased by over 20 percent to reach 58 percent of total national income between 1992 and 1997 (Yepes Palacio:2000). Bibliography Ahumada, C., & Andrews, C. W. (1998). The Impact of Globalization on Latin American States: The cases of Brazil and Colombia. Administrative Theory & Praxis, 20(4), 452-467. Arias, E. D., & Goldstein, D. M. (2010). Violent Democracies in Latin America. Durham [NC]: Duke University Press. Aviles, W. (2006). Paramilitarism and Colombia's Low-Intensity Democracy. Journal of Latin American Studies, 38(2), 379-408. Bejarano, Ana María and Eduardo Pizarro, “From ‘Restricted’ to ‘Besieged’: The Changing Nature of the Limits to Democracy in Colombia.” In Hagopian, Frances and Scott P. Mainwaring, eds.,The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America - Advances and Setbacks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2005 Brubaker, R., & Laitin, D. D. (1998). Ethnic and Nationalist Violence. Annual Review of Sociology. 24(1). 423-452. Dahl, R. (1982). Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. Davila Ladron de Guevara, Andres. (1998). Elecciones en Colombia. Nexos: Sociedad, Ciencia, Literatura, 21(243), 20. Gills, B., & Rocamora, J. (1992). Low Intensity Democracy. Third World Quarterly, 13(3), 501-523. Gills, B. K., 1956, Rocamora, J., & Wilson, R., 1964. (1993). Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order. London;Boulder, CO;: Pluto Press. Guzmán Campos, G. (1962). La Violencia en Colombia: Estudio de un proceso social(2.th ed.). Bogotá, Colombia: Tercer Mundo. Hedstrom, J., & Smith, J. (2013). Overcoming Political Exclusion: Strategies for Marginalized Groups to Successfully Engage in Political Decision-making. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Holmes, J. S., Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, & Curtin, K. M. (2006). Drugs, Violence, and Development in Colombia: A department-Level Analysis. Latin American Politics and Society. 48(3). 157-184. Hylton, F. (2003). An evil hour: Uribe's Colombia in Historical Perspective. New Left Review. (23). 51. Kline, H.F. (1999). State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986-1994. Tuscaloosa/London: The University of Alabama Press. Munck, G. L. (2015). Building Democracy . . . which Democracy? Ideology and Models of Democracy in Post-transition Latin America. Government and Opposition, 50(3), 364-393. NCOS. (1995). Tras los pasos perdidos de la guerra sucia : paramilitarismo y operaciones encubiertas en Colombia. Bruselas: NCOS. O'Donell, G. A. (1994). Delegative democracy. Journal of Democracy, 5(1), 55-69. Palacios, M. (2006). Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-2002. Durham: Duke University Press. Pécaut, D. (2001). Guerra contra la sociedad. Bogota: Editorial Planeta Colombia. Pizarro Leongómez, Eduardo. (1991). Las Farc (1949–1966): De la autodefensa a la combinación de todas las formas de lucha, 1949–1966. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores and Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Ramírez, M.C. (2010). “Maintaining Democracy in Colombia Through Political Exclusion, States of Exception, Counterinsurgency, and Dirty War” in Arias, E. D., & Goldstein, D. M. Violent Democracies in Latin America. Durham [NC]: Duke University Press. Robinson, W. I. (2000). Neoliberalism, the Global Elite, and the Guatemalan Transition: A Critical Macrosocial Analysis. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 42(4), 89-107. (2001). Social theory and globalization: The rise of a transnational state. Theory and Society. 30(2). 157-200. Rojas, C., & Tubb, D. (2013). “La Violencia in Colombia Through Stories of the Body.” Bulletin of Latin American Research. 32(s1). 126-150. Roldan, Mary. (2010). “End of Discussion: Violence, Participatory Democracy, and the Limits of Dissent in Colombia” in Arias, E. D., & Goldstein, D. M. Violent Democracies in Latin America. Durham [NC]: Duke University Press. Schmitter, P. C., & Karl, T. L. (1991). What Democracy is. . . and is not. Journal of Democracy, 2(3), 75-88. Schumpeter, J. A. (1943).Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: George Allen and Unwin. Vanden, H. E., & Prevost, G. (2018). Politics of Latin America: The Power Game(Sixth ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. Watson, C. A. (2000). Civil-military Relations in Colombia: A Workable Relationship or a Case for Fundamental Reform? Third World Quarterly, 21(3), 529-548. World Bank Staff. (2000). Violence in Colombia: Building Sustainable Peace and Social Capital. Washington: World Bank. Yepes Palacio, Andres. (2000) 'Five Years of Constant Reversals,' Social Watch Annual Report: Colombia (2000), http://www.socialwatch.org/en/informelmpreso/pdfs/colombia2000_ eng.pdf. I apologize in advance for sounding pessimistic and maybe being the one to invade your idealistic world, but it is necessary that the crude truth be talked about with limited constraint. When I refer to the truth I seek to avoid philosophical debates and stick to the truth as reference to that which makes my reality; that which I live and experience on a daily basis. Of course your reality might be different than mine, but if this is the case I kindly as you to accept my perspective and reflect upon this humble outlook of life; my reality.
Democracy and democratic debates are what we base the majority of our socio-political efforts on. Thus, I find it crucial to speak out on the current status of our democratic institutions and on our democratic progress as a society. Once again, taking a more realistic view (some might call it pessimistic) I argue that democracy is undergoing a very rapid decay. It is enough to take a superficial analysis of the current shape of the US political situation to understand the dimensions of my argument. However, the democratic "powerhouse"-as it loves to be called- the US is now in a state of political upheaval and confusion. This, however, is not alien to nations around the world. Is this something we should be surprised of? Is this something unprecedented? Who is to blame? In which direction are we headed? Although answering all of these questions may be somewhat ambitious and far-fetched, I am an individual who likes taking risks and this is not the exception. To put my lovely readers into context, the concept of democracy is a very complex concept that would require many lecture classes to fully understand the complexities of the topic. For these purposes I will define a democracy as a politic in which the outcome of elections is representative of the people. In other words, this definition describes a substantive democracy that functions in the interest of the governed. I use this definition of democracy because many argue that a democracy can be considered as such as long as you have "free and fair elections". For me, this is simply being mediocre and minimalist as "free and fair elections" guarantee no protection to the interests of the governed beyond that of whom is above the governed. In this sense, the one being governed is at the mercy of the one governing if the only contribution they have in decision-making is legitimizing the individual's position of power. Today, this might be one of the main reasons why it is an obligation to vote. The elite need to legitimize their control and power, yet the populous is so unmotivated towards democracy that they must be forced to fulfill the minimal characteristic of a democracy. With that in mind, the status of our democratic world is in such a deplorable level that imagining a prosperous, representative, and peaceful democratic state is only the reality of a very small portion of the world population. These are limited to the fortunate scandinavians, Canadians, Australians, the Kiwis, Icelandic, and maybe a few Western European citizens. Since I know some of you will like to see some numbers and since I love to please my readers, I will provide some statistics. The foundations of democracy can be traced back to the French Revolution and its iconic historical events. Samuel Huntington describes Three main waves of democratization or moments in history where we see an increase in democratic states. The First Wave can be traced back to the 19th century after the majority of white men were granted suffrage. At its peak, there where 29 democracies and the stability of these democracies lasted until 1922 and the arrival of Mussolini's Italy in which the following 20 years saw the number of democracies fall to merely 12 democracies. The Second Wave initiated right after the victory of the Allied forces in WWII. This Wave crested 20 years later with 36 recognized democracies. The Third Wave commenced in the late 1970's and extended throughout the 1980s where the world saw the democratization of Latin America, Asia, and later on the fall of the Berlin Wall and the democratization of the Soviet Union. What came in-between these Three Waves of democratization were periods of democratic backsliding. In other words, this is when new democracies end up going back to undemocratic regimes such as the case during the Great Depression and the rise of fascism and during the Cold War and the rise of Communism and Authoritarian Regimes. This last wave of democratization is said to have had a moment of backsliding after the terror attacks of 9/11 and the US intervention in many Middle Eastern countries. On the other hand, scholars argue that a Fourth Wave can be defined after the Arab Spring and the fall of various North African Regimes such as Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. Unfortunately, the success of this last wave of democratization has been shadowed by a return to authoritarianism in Egypt and various of the other states involved in the Arab Spring..which is now coined by scholars as the Arab Winter. Yet, this is not remotely true to these North African countries. It seems to be that democracy all around the world is under threat. This year's Democratic Index reported that only 19 countries are considered full democracies. Fifty-Seven countries are considered to have flawed democracies-the US being one of them, while the remaining 91 countries are considered as Authoritarian or a mix of some other form of regime. Considering that the biggest advocate for democracy (the US) is now considered a flawed democracy, the current welfare of democratic governments has reached a level of uncertainty that leaves us to wonder what is next? However, before I try to answer that question, I must seek to make sense of why this is happening. One can only identify the root of the problem if one refers back to the great thinkers such as Socrates, Plato, and Machiavelli. If these three had anything in common, it was definitely pointing out the flaws in democracy. Due to shortage of time, energy, and knowledge, I will not go into a deep reflection of the philosophical literature found in the work of these three great thinkers. Instead, I will do an analysis of the current global situation. It is no secret to anyone that across the globe citizens are rapidly loosing their patience towards their leaders. However, the populous is unable to act upon this frustration because, more than ever, we have surrendered our political rights to those above us. In essence, those of us who live in democracies have entered that mediocre level of the such where we are only asked upon to participate when elections come around. This, however, is only a method to legitimize the control of the Trumps, the Putins, the Dilmas (Temers), Macris, Maduros., etc.. A bigger problem beyond this is that, as Plato argued, we have voluntarily positioned these power scavengers in positions that dictate the future of our lives. As Plato argued, there would come a time in human history that, due to individualistic, selfish, and untamed manners, we would indulge in our personal liberties and pleasures in such a promiscuous manner that our political conscious would become so distorted that we would be in no competence to make proper political decisions. In reality, Plato was just arguing that we would become so distracted by our personal liberties that all of our efforts would go towards fighting for the freedom to eat whatever we wished, own whatever we desired, and marry whoever we pleased. This would be ensured and protected by our political heads, but the important decisions would be made within a monopoly of power in the hands of the elite. We would eventually become political dummies. Socrates argued that voting and making part of a democratic society carried responsibilities that only an educated and willing society could fulfill. For example, citizens apt for voting would be those who could vote based on an educated decision and analysis of the options, and not simply a mechanized action. The consequence of this not being the case is illustrated by today's reality; an uneducated, misinformed, and incompetent populous. The result...Trump. The result...white supremacist leaders, the rise of Neo-Nazi parties, the rise of populism. No wonder Socrates hated democracy. The worst part is that we are not interested in changing this reality. We do whatever possible to continue misinformed and ignorant. We care about mainstream pop-culture more than our education system. We care more about animal rights than we do our health system. We care more about what type of phone we have rather than worrying about how our actual political system works. We are the ones to blame. Continuing with our ignorance and our limited rational of what truly matters, we have made the ridiculous decision to rely completely on individuals and single political figures to solve all of our political headaches. Recent election results in Turkey, the Philippines, and the US prove that we believe and think that hard-lined, extremist, and charismatic leaders can change the mediocre and deplorable condition of our society in one or two presidential terms. In return, these political leaders prove to be incompetent, unmerciful, and truly detrimental to our political future. They resemble the likes of Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, and all of the other brutal leaders throughout our history. The worst part of it all is that we were warned about making such decision in Machiavelli's 'The Prince'. Although "The Prince" may seem to be a piece of work where Machiavelli sympathized towards the brute leaders of Florence, the reality is that he was illustrating and describing evil so that we, as a society, could act upon the Good and avoid the Bad. One of his warnings was that of which we should never rely or depend completely on populist leaders in return for security, peace, or stability. In conclusion, it should come to no surprise when we observe the worrying state of our democratic institutions. Instead, we should reflect upon and realize that we have been warned and cautioned about these events. It is no coincidence that Socrates was hesitant towards democracy. It is no surprise that Plato was a supporter of an autocratic political system in which the autocrat was the philosopher who lived outside of the cave and had the knowledge, intelligence, and competence to make the decisions that favoured the whole. Simply put, Plato knew that the commoners would be too ignorant to make decisions on their own and that only the intellectually gifted could take on such responsibility. The problem is that the political figures of today aren't the intellectually gifted, but rather the corrupt, ambitious, greedy, and power-seeking hypocrites of society. It would be even more ignorant if we blame those who we have voluntarily and willingly surrendered our political liberties to, for it is our own responsibility to change the path of our history and determine the outcomes of our future. One can travel to Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and even across the Central American countries and one will find a similarity in cultural traits. Of course, it would be ignorant of myself to ignore the significant cultural differences amongst each country, yet there is a combined sense of Latin American pride among the nations. Although I have not travelled to every single one of these countries, I have been able to interact and talk to people from these various nations and I can say that I have been able to connect on various cultural perspectives whether it be music, literature, art, or history. Thus, I can say there is a sense of being Latin American thanks to a cultural identity within my Latin American brothers that unites us all.
I must say that Brazil is definitely the exception; it seems to me as if this nation is resistant towards all of that which represents Latin America, its history, and its culture. Initially, one could argue that this is due to the difference in language: Portuguese in Brazil and Spanish in the majority of all the other Latin American countries. Hence, one would assume that its Portuguese heritage would be the factor behind such radical and extreme resistance towards integrating and assimilating into Latin American culture. In other words, it's as if Brazil wants to stand out from other Latin American nations by trying not to be Latin American. I am no one to judge whether this is good or not, but I must say that Brazil's integration and further collaboration with Latin American countries would make the region grow in global influence, power, and significance on the word stage when merely assessing population and geographical size. However, the already weakening bond among Latin American nations due to varied national interests is exacerbated by Brazil's lack of efforts in embracing the region's history, heritage, culture, and identity. This is evident whenever I talk to a Brazilian and he or she is more capable of identifying European and North American cultural traits rather than that of neighbouring countries. As a simply example, the fact that most Brazilians are more eager to learn English rather than Spanish seems astonishing to me since there is a huge economic and political importance in Brazilians being capable of communicating with companies, businesses, and governmental institutions in neighbouring countries. If english were well spoken across all the countries of Latin America then there would be a good justification for the use of english, but in fact english proficiency across Latin America, although improving, is quite lacking. Others may argue that it is more important for Brazilians to learn english because the majority of international trade and business is done with the USA. Well...in fact this is not so. Brazil's major trading partner, by a large margin, is China and then the Latin American region...so how about learning Chinese? It would be the most logical solution. Yet, the truth is that Brazilians themselves, specially upperclass citizens, have been disconnecting themselves from their endemic culture and identity. One can blame globalization for this, but the rate of which this is happening in Brazil is drastic. Brazil's newest generation is more aquatinted with Ed Sheeran, Katy Perry, Justin Beiber, and the Kardashians than they are with local Brazilian artists and musicians. Is as if, at a rapid pace, Brazilian heritage was being erased, wiped out, and replaced by American culture. I must say that even in upperclass schools there is a move towards an American education while the Portuguese curriculum becomes more insignificant every day. This is not a new phenomenon. As some scholars note (Guedes-Bailey & Jambeiro Barbosa 2008 and Matos 2012) the consolidation of Brazilian media (Television and Radio) has been greatly influenced by the US model and its content constantly includes American advertisement and programming. As Guedes Bailey & Jambeiro (2008, p. 55) argue, Brazil has been politically, culturally and economically influenced by the American media and Brazilian culture has developed parallel to American mass market industrialization, capital concentration, and consumeristic mentality. This has definitely shaped Brazilian society as it has become a society of mass consumption in its ambition to obtain its capitalist goals. The cause of this, under my analysis, is that the Brazilian elite is doing anything possible in order to become more ‘modernized’ and more Western while the middle and low class population are steadily getting fed the same content as mass media attempts to reach a wider audience. Hence, this results in a society that resembles a western philosophy, or in this case an American one where every aspect of society is exposed to American culture and practices through media, arts, music, and education. This transition from a traditional Brazilian culture to an American ‘way of life’ happens at a much more rapid rate with a much higher degree of intensity at the elite level when everything American or Western becomes the desired, the fashionable, and the norm. When local elite schools try to implement American curriculums as their educational platform through partnerships with American universities such as Texas Tech or Missouri University, the extent in which American culture is replacing Portuguese culture becomes worrying and saddening. It is indeed sad that today's Brazilian young generation knows more about American history and literature than they do about their own Brazilian history and literature. This is a sad occurrence when Brazil is a country that has so much to offer when we look at its own heritage and its rich and colourful culture full of life and diversity. DIVERSITY....that is precisely what Brazil should represent and that is exactly what it should strive for. Diversity is what should identify Brazilians. Brazilians should not fall into the great mistake of loosing their diversity just for the simply fact of satisfying American trends and desires. So, after two months after arriving in Brazil I am now able to comment on some first impressions of this country and its society. Being driven to Brazil due to the continuous emphasis that experts put on its emerging economy and rapid development, I was eager to see the product that economic growth and steady modernization looked like in Latin America's largest and most influential country. Maybe I held the misconception that economic growth, rapid modernization (whatever that means), and steady rise in international influence meant an improvement in living standards, reduction in extreme poverty, and an overall development in social well-being. Yet, I must say that I have been largely disappointed by what I have seen.
In other words, I do not see the benefits of economic growth. I do not see prosperity anywhere. The streets are still filled with poverty, misery, and injustice. Although Brazil's GDP is exponentially larger than other Latin American countries, I do not see a significant difference in the country's infrastructure, health care, nor do I see it in the government's provision of public services. To put it all into context, Brazil does not even come close to the US, Canada, or any of the Western European countries in terms of quality of life, yet Brazil has a larger GDP than many of nations considered developed. On the contrary, Brazil is filled with deplorable levels of inequality, embarrassing levels of corruption, and a deteriorating system of government. To be honest, I think other criticized South American nations are way better off than Brazil. I can assure you that, as a Colombian national having spent some time living Colombia and in Brazil, I feel less ripped off and lied to by the Colombian government than any Brazilian here feels about their own government. Why is this? Three simple reasons: 1) Brazilian politicians make almost three times what a Colombian politician makes. 2) Although Brazil has a significantly larger GDP and is also exponentially more powerful in regards to its resources, which should essentially mean more money to invest in the country, the conditions of its infrastructure, its health care system, and the government's provision of public goods and services are as mediocre or even worse than that of Colombia. 3) Colombians and the Colombian government can at least partially blame 50+ years of internal civil war for its inability to bring economic and social prosperity to the country. Yes, Brazil has gone through two dictatorships (Gertulio Vargas 1930-1945 and the authoritarian regime that ruled Brazil from April 1, 1964 to March 15, 1985) which gives many people the possibility to argue that this is the root cause behind Brazil's various socio-economic problems. However, if we take a look at Chile's and Argentina's experience with dictatorships and their aftermath, we can see that these two countries are currently far better off than Brazil in various aspects of social well-being. Hence, reading scholarly work and hearing academics talk about Brazil being one of the most important emerging economies, and seeing mass media outlets place Brazil as an economic model that other countries should seek to follow...I must say that I do not want anything to do with this type of economic growth and modernization. Seeing small children living under a bridge that marks the boundary between Sao Paulo's luxurious neighbourhoods and the favelas which are home to the city's 'mendigos', begging for money, and waiting for the day to bring them something to eat while my most cars pass by ignoring this part of Brazilian reality reassures me that there is a big hole in the definition of economic growth and modernization. Who is to blame for this? How does media shape the way we perceive and accept this reality? Does the media help shape these perceptions of economic prosperity and modernization? |
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David Romero Archives
August 2019
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